



Defendant's truck driver, Russell, was permitted to take
defendant's truck to his home over the 4th of July weekend. He
had on one occasion made a sale to a customer and had obtained
permission to solicit another order from this customer one month
previously. On the Fourth of July, Russell left in the truck to solicit
the order. Discovering he had no cigarettes, Russell went past the
intersection leading to the customer's home and bought cigarettes
at the village of Goshen. He started back in less than two hours
to solicit the order and on approaching the intersection leading to
the customer's home, he could see that the customer's car was not in
his yard, and knowing of his habit of keeping the car in his yard,
concluded he was not at home. Russell proceeded to his own home
and was opening the gate to drive the truck into his yard when the
collision occurred, injuring the plaintiff, a guest in the other car.
Held, for plaintiff. The jury found that Russell was negligent in
the scope of his employment. Rhude v. Ed. G. Koehi Inc., 55 Ohio
L. Abs. 532 (1948).
It is not every turning away from his duties by the servant
which constitutes a departure from his scope of employment and
consequent suspension of the liability of the master for the acts
of the servant. To constitute a departure there must be a complete
turning away from the business of the employer. Fleichma-an V.
Howe, 213 Ky. 110, 280 S. W. 496 (1926); Schultze v. McGuire, 241
N. Y. 460, 150 N. E. 516 (1926). It is generally agreed that once the
servant does turn away completely from his duties the liability of
the master for the acts of his servant is suspended from that moment
until the servant again takes up the business of the employer.
Adomoitis v. Hopkins, 95 Conn. 239, 111 Atl. 178 (1920); Graves v.
Utica Candy Co., 211 App. Div. 872, 206 N. Y. Supp. 911 (1924).
A more difficult problem is presented in determining when the
servant has returned to the scope of his employment so as to make
liable the master for any subsequent acts. In a few cases it has been
held that the servant returns to the scope of his employment
as soon as he starts back to take up his duties. Mancuso v. Hurwitz-
Mintz Furniture Co., 183 So. 461 (1938); Gilbert v. Trotter, 160 So.
855 (1935). Other courts require the employee to be where he
would have been if he had never departed from his employment.
Southwest Dairy Products Co., Inc. v. Def rates, 132 Tex. 556, 125
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S.W. 2d 282 (1939); Chisos Mining Co. v. Pedro Huerta, 141 Tex.
289, 171 S.W. 2d 867 (1943). The majority adopting an intermediate
view, requires the servant to be reasonably close to the place he
would have been if he had never left his employment. Riley v. Stand-
ard Oil of N. Y., 231 N. Y. 301, 132 N. E. 97 (1921); Fiacco v. Carver,
234 N. Y. 219, 137 N. E. 309 (1922).
In its opinion the court stated that when the acts of the em-
ployee, from their nature, may or may not be in the course of his
employment, the controlling test is the motive "or intent of the em-
ployee. While the motive or intent of the employee is always a factor
to be considereda it is not the debisive test in imputing liability to the
employer for the employee's negligence. 1 MEcHE ON AGENCY 1462,
§ 188Z (2d ed. 1914). The motive or intent of the employee is
controlling only when he has committed a wilful tort. The employer
cannot be held for the wilful tort of his servant unless it was com-
mitted to carry out the' instructions of the employer. Ploof v.
Putnam, 83 Vt. 252,75 Atl. 277 (1910,; C.&O. Ry. Co. v. Ford, 158
Ky. 800, 166 S. W. 605 (1914).
It would seem that the court reached the correct decision in
the principal case. The defendant was liable under any of the tests
noted for resumption of the liability of the employer since Russell
had returned to the place he would have been if he had never
departed from his employment. However, it would appear that since
no wilful tort was involved, the motive or intention test used by the
court was inapplicable.
John D. Duffy
DECEDENTS ESTATES-WRIT Or PRoHImroN No SUBSTITUTs
For APPEAL Ix CASE Or DOUBLE PROBATE
Myra Shane, a resident of Hamilton County, died in Preble
County. Her first will was probated in Hamilton County, then her
second will was probated in Preble County over the protest of
James Clary, the administrator c.t.a. appointed in Hamilton County.
Clary sought a writ of prohibition. Held writ denied. State ex rel.
Clary v. Probate Judge of Preble County, 151 Ohio St. 497, 86 N.E.
2d 765 (1949).
As a general rule in Ohio prohibition is an extraordinary remedy
and not a substitute for appeal, and will be granted only when a
court is obviously exceeding its jurisdiction. When the determination
of jurisdiction depends on the facts of the case it is the court that
must decide whether the facts necessary for jurisdiction are present
That is, " A writ of prohibition will not issue against a court having
jurisdiction of the subject matter of an action pending before it or
to deprive such court of the authority vested in it by the laws of
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the state of Ohio to determine its own jurisdiction." 31 0. Jura. 581.
And the laws of Ohio do grant the probate courts power to deter-
mine the facts of their jurisdiction. Schroyer v. Richmond, 16 Ohio
St. 455 (1865).
The problem facing the supreme court was: did the provision
of Ohio General Code Section 10501-55 that "The jurisdiction ac-
quired by a probate court over a matter or proceeding is exclusive
of that of any other probate court, except where otherwise pro-
vided by law," deprive the Preble County Probate Court of juris-
diction of the subject matter in this case? The supreme court opined
that "it is otherwise provided by law" that a will shall be probated
in the county in which the testator was domiciled, if ai the time of
his death he was domiciled in the state. Orno GEN. CODE § 10504-15.
In a situation involving administrators rather than executors,
appointed by different probate courts, the supreme court reached
a result opposite from that in the principal case. State ex. rel Taylor
v. Gregory, 122 Ohio St. 512, 172 N.E. 365 (1930). The only other
case in which the situation of the principal case was present, was a
nisi prius case in which the judge of the first probate court in order
to assume jurisdiction refused to surrender control of the case to
the Lucas County personal representative. In re Estate of Henry
Worthington, 4 Ohio Dec. 381 (Probate Ct. Hamilton County 1896).
The statutes involved in that case are the same as those in the
principal case.
Ohio General Code Section 10501-55 was originally enacted in
1853 and its wording has remained unchanged. It has been held to
establish that the jurisdiction of a probate court, once acquired over
an estate, is exclusive of that of every other probate court. State
ex. rel. Black v. White, 132 Ohio St. 58, 63, 5 N.E. 2d 84 (1936). This
position was first attacked in the case of State ex rel. Overlander v.
Brewer, 147 Ohio St. 386, 72 N.E. 2d 84 (1947). In that case the
decedent had died a resident of Mahoning County and intestate ad-
ministration had been granted there, when a will was sought to be
probated in Cuyahoga County. The court held that since a will is to
be probated in the county in which decedent was domiciled and
intestate administration is granted in the county in which the de-
cedent was resident. OHio GFrq. CODE §§ 10504-14 and 10509-1. This
is under the exception "where otherwise provided by law" included
in Ohio General Code Section 10501-55 which prevents the intent
of the statute from operating. By this construction the supreme
court manages to reach the same result as in State ex rel. Barbee v.
Allen, 96 Ohio St. 10, 117 N.E. 13 (1917). The Barbee case is dis-
tinguishable on the facts since the relator was the executor ap-
pointed by the second -probate court, and the statutes construed in
1950]
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the principal case were not relied on by the court although both
were in effect at the time.
The result of this case is the re-affirming of the old rule that a
judgment of a probate court could be collaterally attacked by an-
other probate court for lack of jurisdiction, a condition that Ohio
General Code Section 10501-55 was intended to correct. This condi-
tion prevails in Kentucky where it causes much confusion. Evans,
The Venue of Probate Proceedings in Kentucky, 6 Ky. ST. B. J. 13
(1941).
Most states have avoided this problem by changing the fact of
residence from a jurisdictional matter to one of venue, thus avoid-
ing collateral attack on probate proceedings. It was believed that
this problem had been avoided in Ohio by the provision in Ohio
General Code Sections 10504-15 and 10501-56 allowing appeal from
contest of jurisdiction in probate court. Basye, The Venue of Pro-
bate and Administration Proceedings, 43 MicH. L. REv. 471 (1944).
The problem has been attacked in a host of ways. Wisconsin
provides that when a court has found the jurisdictional fact of res-
idence present, its judgments or proceedings may not be collaterally
attacked on those grounds. Wis. STATUTES 253.03 (1943). In Minn-
esota it is required in case of conflict as to venue that the second
court shall stay all proceedings until the first court has ruled as to
its venue. MqxN. STATUTES § 525.82 (1945). Many states hold that
the first court acquiring jurisdiction has exclusive and exhaustive
jurisdiction. Basye, The Venue of Probate and Administration Pro-
ceedings 43 MZcH. L. REv. 471 (1944).
With due respect for the judgment and wisdom of the supreme
court it seems that the decision in this case could have been as well,
if not more excusably decided the other way. Jurisdiction is by
its nature either exclusive or concurrent, it can not be both. If the
jurisdiction is exclusive "except where otherwise provided by law,"
it must be concurrent when so otherwise provided. Yet in will pro-
bate proceedings of the resident decedent, jurisdiction is only in the
county of domicile. Omo GEN. CoDE § 10504-15. Surely, however, the
court does not mean to say that a decedent had two domiciles; and
if so the rule propounded in Merril v. Lake would hold, "where
there are two courts of equal or concurrent jurisdiction, that the
court possesses the case in which jurisdiction first attaches." 16 Ohio
374, 405 (1847). And since Ohio law provides that a probate court
is competent to determine the facts of its own jurisdiction and ap-
peal from such determination is provided for, it would seem that
comity would require more respect for the determinations of other
probate courts as to their jurisdiction. If the present trend, as ex-
emplified by the principal case, is followed to its logical result we
may well find the probate courts of the various counties actively
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competing with one another to supervise the estates of decedents




Plaintiff, in his amended petition, purported to represent him-
self and approximately 700,000 other gas consumers who purchased
gas from defendants, gas and electric corporations, between the
years 1929 to 1937. The gravamen of the complaint was the alleged
secret dilution of natural gas by means of inert gas. Plaintiff's prayer
was for an injunction prohibiting the billing of consumers for diluted
gas until proper charges had been determined and prohibiting
dilution in the future; for a finding of the aggregate amount of
damages suffered by plaintiff and those he represents and that a
master be appointed who would require each defendant to account
for and turn into the custody of the court all the funds which it
received at any time by reason of said secret dilution. A general
demurrer to the original petition was sustained by the trial court on
the ground that the action was not maintainable as a class suit and
judgment was entered for the defendants. The court of appeals re-
versed, directing that plaintiff be permitted to amend his petition
with instructions that if a general demurrer should be filed thereto
to overrule the same. Davies v. Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., 51
Ohio L. Abs. 372, 79 N.E. 2d 327 (1948), 9 Omo ST. L.J. 704. Held,
reversing the appellate court, that the amended petition was in-
sufficient to support a class suit. 151 Ohio St. 417, 86 N.E. 2d 603
(1949).
Ohio General Code Section 11257 provides, "When the question
is one of common or general interest of many persons, or the parties
are very numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before
the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all."
The standard code provisions for class actions or representative suits
are not sufficiently explicit and the confusion in Ohio concerning
their proper interpretation is typical. There is no outstanding weight
of authority, at the present time, to aid the courts in this matter.
Federal Rule 23 is much more specific in that it classifies representa-
tive suits into true, hybrid and spurious. Perhaps as a result of this
classification the principles involved in class actions have been de-
veloped significantly by the federal courts since 1938. A few of the
states have copied this rule.
The court first pointed out that under the statutes quoted, in
the principal case, "there must be a community of interest plus a
right of recovery based upon the same essential facts, and all those
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on whose behalf the suit is fied must have an. interest in common or
identical with that.of the person in whose name the suit is brought."
In support of this the court cited Trustees of Jackson Twp. v.
Thoman, 51 Ohio St. 285, 37 N.E. 523 (1894); Duncan v. Willis, 51
Ohio St. 433, 38 N.E. 13 (1894); Stevens v. Cincinnati Times-Star
Co., 72 Ohio St. 112, 73 N.E. 1058 (1905); Haggerty v. Squire, Supt.
of Banks, 137 Ohio St. 207, 28 N. E. 2d 554 (1940); Wheatley,
Trustee, v. A. I. Root Co., 147 Ohio St. 127, 69 N.E. 2d 187 (1946).
The consumers represented are scattered throughout Ohio. They
'paid different rates and purchased under different franchises, con-
tracts and ordinances. From this the court concluded that there was
no community of interest plus a right of recovery based upon the
same essential facts between plaintiff and those he purports to rep-
resent; stating that it could not be said that plaintiff is acting
pursuant to the wishes and desires of all such persons, because some
might not wish to sue at all and others might wish to sue for breach
of contract or for restitution, in which event the parties defendant
would not be the same. The objection that some might not wish to
sue at all might be made in most class actions, but this objection by
itself has not generally been thought to preclude this type of action.
However, the court no doubt had in mind ana is hereby approving
the action of the parties themselves in the Wheatley case, supra. In
that case the record shows that the parties themselves, by stipulation
in the court of common pleas, divided the preferred shareholders into
classes in accordance with the attitude of each as to consent, ac-
quiescence or opposition in connection with the recapitalization of
the A. I. Root Co.
Although both the Wheatley and Haggerty cases, supra, would
permit a class suit when the causes of action arise from a common
source and represent a like interest or when parties were very
numerous, the court apparently did not consider the rule applicable
to the instant factual situation, emphasizing the lack of factual
similarity between the parties represented. Less rigid requirements
as to factual similarity have been indicated. Smith v. Kroeger, 138
Ohio St. 508, 37 N.E. 2d 45 (1941); McKenzie v. L'Amoureux, 11
BARB. 516 (N.Y. 1851); Hilton Bridge Const. Co. v. Foster, 26 Misc.
338, 57 N.Y. Supp. 1106 (3d Dep't 1899); PoMERY, EQurrY JuRispRu-
DENcE 510 (5th ed. 1941). But see Garfein v. Steglitz, 260 Ky. 430, 86
S.W. 2d 155 (1935); Wheaton, Representative Suits Involving Nu-
merous Litigants, 19 CoRN. L.Q. 434 (1933); Lesar, Class Suits and
the Federal Rules, 22 BNN. L. REv. 36 (1937).
In the principal case the court pronounced the recovery of
damages for all those who were allegedly defrauded as the primary
object of the action and the relief of an equitable character merely
-ancillary. To this extent the court hinted that the statute applies
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only to equitable causes. It is generally held, however, that the
statute applies to legal and equitable causes. Platt v. Colvin, 50 Ohio
St. 703, 36 N.E. 735 (1893); Cherry v. Howell, 4 F.Supp. 597 (E.D.
N.Y. 1933) (but not fraud or deceit); Colt v. Hicks, 97 Ind. App.
177,179 N.E. 335 (1932); Walker v. Village of Dillonvale, 82 Ohio St.
137, 92 N.E. 220 (1910). One such view is that the statute is a
codification of the equitable bill of peace. POMEROY, EQUITY JURIs-
PRUDENCE, supra at p. 463.
Although stressing the above reasons for reversal the court was
also of the opinion that in view "of the orders issued, adjustments
made and rates determined by the Public Utilities Commission af-
fecting gas consumers in Columbus and covering the years men-
tioned in the amended petition, some of them pursuant to the judg-
ments of this court, it is extremely doubtful whether the plaintiff
has sustained any loss or damage which would support his action."
In addition, the court held that since the total claim of the plaintiff
is less than $100, it would not be sufficient to confer original juris-
diction on the court of common pleas. Ohio General Code Section
11215. And, being an action of this type, the total claims of the class
may not be aggregated to supply the necessary jurisdictional amount.
Hackner v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 2 Cir., 117 F. 2d 95,
cert. denied, 313 U. S. 559 (1941); Quinlan, Aud., v. Myers, 29 Ohio
St. 500 (1876). On this point the court once again is in conflict with
the view expressed above concerning the equitable bill of peace
which gives a court of equity jurisdiction to prevent a multiplicity
of suits regardless of the amount of the claim.
The court did not mention the prodigious accounting task that
would be involved in distributing the damages to the various con-
sumers if the case had been decided in favor of the plaintiff, although
this administrative problem could properly be considered by a court
of equity in exercising its discretion to grant or withhold relief.
Jack V. Danaher.
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